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Abstract 
This study applied a social representations approach to investigate the ways in which 
constructions of perceived political disagreement and the prevailing opinion climate were 
implicated in people’s construals of political participation in the context of the United 
Kingdom European Union referendum of 2016. Interviews were conducted with 19 residents 
of the United Kingdom who voted to remain in the referendum, located in constituencies 
which represented diverse opinion climates in relation to the referendum. Thematic analysis 
of the data revealed a social representation of public opinion characterised by ambivalence; it 
was inscrutable and often ill-informed but also volatile and disruptive, which left open the 
possibility of it moving towards a more pro-EU position. Furthermore, constructions of a 
polarised and dysfunctional political system worked to sustain a mode of political 
engagement which prioritised and positioned as efficacious individual rather than collective 
anti-Brexit political behaviour. These findings are discussed in relation to their implications 
for understandings of support for forms of democratic governance as well as previous work 
linking meta-representations to political behaviour and expression.  





Much research within political psychology and political science has addressed the 
way in which perceptions of public opinion, particularly political disagreement and readings 
of the prevailing opinion climate, shape people’s political expression and participation, with 
some studies suggesting that these experiences have a ‘dampening effect’ in particular 
contexts (e.g. Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; Noelle-Neumann, 1974). However, other 
studies have found that perceptions of political disagreement or a hostile opinion climate 
might instead motivate people to engage politically in certain situations (e.g. Louis, Duck, 
Terry, & Lalonde, 2010), or to moderate their political engagement in some way (e.g. Vraga, 
Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 2015).  
Perceptions of political disagreement and of the prevailing opinion climate can both 
be considered as components of the meta-representational fabric of a society; they refer to 
judgments, conscious or not, of the ‘sharedness’ of one’s opinions and the way in which these 
might be received by others. A social representations approach (SRA) highlights the 
importance of these meta-representations (e.g. Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; O’Dwyer, 
Lyons, & Cohrs, 2016) for accounts and explanations of political behaviour and opinion, but, 
importantly, acknowledges that these meta-representations are changeable, context-
dependent, and mediated (Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016). Furthermore, according to a SRA, 
they are constructed, which necessarily means that they can be reconstructed to enable and 
empower, rather than silence. Adopting this theoretical lens, the current study investigates the 
relationship between perceptions of political disagreement and opinion climate, and 
constructions of political participation and engagement in the context of the ‘emergent form’ 
(Andreouli, Kaposi, & Stenner, 2019) of the 2016 United Kingdom (UK) referendum vote to 
leave the European Union (EU).  
The Influence of Perceptions of Public Opinion on Political Behaviour and Expression  
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The way in which public opinion is perceived (or misperceived) impacts on an 
individual’s willingness to engage politically, for example, to speak out about controversial 
or moral issues. Public opinion is defined here as “opinions on controversial issues that one 
can express in public without isolating oneself” (Noelle-Neumann, 1984, pp. 62-63). This 
links to a conceptualisation of public opinion as social control, distinct from its conception as 
rationality enacted in the public sphere. A consideration of public opinion as social control, 
as a means through which societies facilitate social cohesion through consensus, differs from 
the rational model in three key ways (Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Unlike the rational model, the 
social control model conceptualises public opinion as (1) working through non-verbal and 
visual material (e.g. banners), as well as reasoned debate and discussion; (2) mostly 
unconscious and not dependent on motivation or ability; and (3) involving all in society, not 
just an informed and motivated sub-set of the population.  
Research has examined the ways in which perceptions of public opinion, broadly 
defined in line with the social control model above, affect political behaviour and expression. 
For example, studies have examined the consequences of experiencing political 
disagreement, or occupying an opinion climate which legitimises opposing values or beliefs, 
for political behaviour and expression. Political disagreement may have a dampening effect 
on these behaviours, through the stimulation of attitudinal ambivalence and conflict 
avoidance tendencies (Mutz, 2002). Relatedly, those who hold minority opinions may express 
their attitudes more slowly than those whose views correspond to those of the majority – the 
minority slowness effect. Using correlational data from five studies with Canadian students 
and non-students, minority opinions on a range of issues were expressed more slowly than 
majority opinions, and this difference in response latency was related to the difference in size 
between the minority and majority (Bassili, 2003). In addition, this difference in response 
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latency was largest for participants who had more accurate estimates of majority and minority 
support among their fellow university students.  
The effect of perceived political disagreement on political behaviour and expression 
has also been investigated in relation to social networks such as Facebook. A mixed-methods 
study with young people in the United States of America explored their views about political 
discussion on Facebook (Vraga et al., 2015). Qualitative analysis revealed negative 
perceptions of political discussion on Facebook, which shaped political engagement on this 
website, by motivating them to avoid it completely or focus on uncontroversial issues, for 
example. Survey data showed that the effect of perceived political disagreement on the belief 
that Facebook was an appropriate place to discuss politics was moderated by conflict 
avoidance, while its effect on willingness to post political content was moderated by both 
conflict avoidance and political interest. Other studies which have investigated the effect of 
perceived disagreement on political behaviours have pointed to additional moderators, such 
as generalised social trust (Matthes, 2012) and the extent of political disagreement (Nir, 
2011). Importantly, whether political disagreement is perceived as demobilising is also 
dependent on whether the opinion held is a minority or majority view (McClurg, 2006).  
Spiral of silence theory (e.g. Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 
2004) also specifies the importance of perceptions of public opinion on political expression 
and behaviour. At the most basic level, this theory posits that an individual’s perception of 
the opinion climate, particularly the extent to which their view is shared, will affect their 
willingness to speak out. As these perceptions are taken from cues in the social environment, 
for example in the media (where there may be vocal or highly salient actors), people may 
have biased interpretations of the majority/minority status of their beliefs. Additionally, 
people are responsive to changes in the opinion climate, such that if they perceive their views 
as growing in popularity, they will be more likely to speak out. The reverse will take place if 
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they perceive their views to be on a downward trajectory. A meta-analysis found a small 
significant positive correlation between perceived support for opinion and willingness to 
speak out (Glynn et al., 1997). However, Bodor (2012) critiqued the “microscopic approach” 
(p. 273) taken to a complex multilevel theory in previous empirical tests, and pointed to two 
key factors which might explain the lack of support found for the theory. Firstly, the 
operationalisation of the independent variable in terms of perceived opinion congruity fails to 
recognise that gauging the opinion climate is often an unconscious process. Secondly, the 
failure to identify the spiral of silence in previous work might plausibly be explained by the 
timing of data collection, as the silence hypothesis should only be supported at a particular 
point in the process specified in Noelle-Neumann’s theory. Similarly, Scheufle and Moy 
(2000) pointed to problems with operationalisation (i.e. of the dependent variable, speaking 
out), and the failure to account for important macro-level variables (e.g. examining cultural 
differences, media influences), in spiral of silence research.  
There may also be other factors which determine whether a hostile opinion climate 
brings about a ‘dampening effect’ on political behaviour and expression. Across three survey 
studies with Swiss participants in relation to a number of moral issues, the effect of opinion 
climate (majority/minority) on political expression was moderated by attitude extremity 
(Matthes, Rios Morrison, & Schemer, 2010). For people who were high in attitude certainty, 
there was no relationship between opinion climate and political expression, while for those of 
low or moderate attitude certainty, opinion climate negatively affected political expression.  
Conversely, the perception that one’s views are being silenced may instead motivate 
people to speak out (Louis et al., 2010). Among white Australian supporters of a new 
conservative political movement, willingness to speak out about the issue of Asian 
immigration and get involved in the political debate was predicted by the perceived threat of 
Asian immigration to White Australians and the perception that most Australians were also 
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opposed to Asian immigration. However, for opponents of this movement, the perception that 
public opinion was becoming more opposed to Asian immigration, as well as higher 
education and positive personal opinions towards Asian immigration, positively predicted 
their willingness to speak out about the issue and get involved in the political debate.  
Most of the research which has explored the effect of perceived political disagreement 
and construals of the opinion climate in relation to political behaviour and expression has 
used quantitative methods. Therefore, little is known about the ways in which people 
construct public opinion, or the way in which these constructions are implicated in political 
participation and opinion. Furthermore, I argue that this research has tended to downplay the 
changeable, mediated, and context-dependent nature of relevant constructs, such as opinion 
climate. Additionally, the research does not give enough credence to individual agency, to 
resist or recast norms, beliefs, and opinions which constitute the social normative context. To 
address these concerns, I adopted a SRA (e.g. Moscovici, 1961/76; Elcheroth et al., 2011) in 
this study.  
Meta-Representations, Political Behaviour, and the Public 
Work utilising a SRA is concerned often with the content of common sense and the 
processes which give rise to it (e.g. Moscovici, 1961/76). This stock of lay knowledge is 
underpinned by a “dialectic of cooperation and conflict” (Howarth, 2006, p. 71): social 
representations are characterised by their argumentative nature, their contradictions and 
ambivalence, as much as by consensus.  
Two related strands of research within the SRA have relevance to the aims of the 
current study. Firstly, a recent line of work has emphasised the importance of meta-
representations, as ‘world-making assumptions’ (Elcheroth et al., 2011) for understandings 
of social change and has investigated their impact in relation to political behaviour and 
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opinion. Meta-representations are “perceptions of what most others value or reject…along 
with beliefs regarding what relevant others know, think or intend to do more generally” 
(Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016, p. 662). Staerklé, Clémence and Spini (2011) assert the 
importance of intergroup boundaries and intragroup contestation and debate for the impact of 
meta-representational processes on the construction of political knowledge. Meta-
representations thus encompass perceived political disagreement and readings of the opinion 
climate; however, the SRA differs from the research reviewed above through its 
conceptualisation of the social normative context as dynamic, context-dependent, and 
mediated, as well as influential for behaviour and contingent on social identity processes 
(Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016).  
Three recent studies have applied this lens to political behaviour and opinion. A 
longitudinal and experimental study conducted at a traditionally left-wing Parisian university, 
found that when students were told that the majority of French students were positive about 
the far-right National Front party, they were less willing to voice their opposition towards the 
party by signing up to participate in a workshop to discuss its politics (Portelinha & 
Elcheroth, 2016). Similarly, when Swiss students who identified strongly with their 
university, which was known for its opposition to the right-wing populist party (the Swiss 
People’s Party, SPP), read material which emphasised the traditional ideological differences 
between the university’s social science students and the SPP, they were less likely to 
volunteer for a follow-up focus group to discuss a vote proposed by the SPP (Goncalves-
Portelinha, Staerklé, & Elcheroth, 2017). Finally, an analysis of focus group discussions with 
Irish citizens about foreign policy (O’Dwyer et al., 2016) demonstrated that younger Irish 
citizens’ awareness of and orientation towards the policy stance of neutrality as widely 
understood as hypocritical and partial opened up a space for these participants to argue for 
alternative foreign policy positions. This implies that meta-representations have the capacity 
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to enable and empower, as well as silence and demobilise, as they can provide the impetus 
and discursive resources, for the advancement of alternative representations and thus social 
and political change. 
A second strand of research with relevance to the aims of the current study concerns 
the public sphere and public narratives. The public sphere as a place of ‘otherness’, distinct 
from the familial and the private is a historical artefact linked to the growth of indoor spaces, 
the preserve of the patriarchal family, and it is this development which sets up a contrast 
between the private, indoor spaces of subjectivity and relationships, and the public arena ‘out 
there’ of citizenship and debate (Jovchelovitch, 1995). Social representations are inextricably 
linked to the public sphere – their contents are shaped by its interactions, the media, and the 
other various communicative practices which constitute it (Jovchelovitch, 1995). They are 
elaborated relationally, in conversation with the public sphere: “agentic sense making… is 
shaped by existing and imagined conversations relating both to prosaic matters and the wider 
political conversations that circulate” (Mahendran, Jackson, & Kapoor, 2015, p. 147).  
Illustrating this, empirical work examining EU citizens’ engagement with public 
narratives on the European Union, European citizenship, mobility and migration, showed a 
process of authoring, in which people integrated and spoke to the arguments of others to 
elaborate their positions (e.g. Mahendran, 2017; Mahendran et al., 2015). Mahendran (2018) 
further described six positions taken by EU citizens when generalising the public in talk 
about EU integration. Participants often moved between these oppositional and non-
oppositional positions, which differed in terms of where how the public was positioned 
temporally, spatially, and relationally. This understanding of the ‘dialogical citizen’ 
developed here, along with work on meta-representations reviewed above, affords us with a 
view of the political subject as agentic and constantly in conversation with the opinions and 
narratives which characterise the public sphere.  
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’Brexit’: The Political Context and Current Research  
In the referendum of the 23rd June 2016, a majority (52%) of voters in the United 
Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). Since that date, the ‘Brexit’ issue 
has dominated political discourse in the UK, and political developments have been 
unpredictable and constant. In spite of this difficulty, I will provide a brief outline of some of 
the key events here to contextualise the study.  
Following almost a year of negotiations with the EU, in June 2017, a general election 
delivered a hung parliament, contrary to predictions of a Conservative party majority win. 
Without a majority, the Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May subsequently negotiated a 
minority government by way of a ‘confidence and supply’ voting arrangement with the 
Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party. May negotiated a withdrawal agreement with 
the EU and sought two extensions to the UK’s leaving date in order to find the necessary 
parliamentary support for it. Unable to do so, and in the aftermath of a poor Conservative 
party performance in the European Parliament elections, she resigned as Prime Minister in 
June 2019. At the time of writing, the UK is set to leave the EU on the 31st October 2019 
under the direction of the new Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. The possibility 
remains that this will take place even in the absence of agreeing the terms of the UK’s 
departure with the EU, and a further general election looks imminent.  
A growing body of work within political psychology attempts to explain Brexit using 
a variety of approaches. Qualitative work has focused on the different category constructions, 
arguments, and meanings mobilised by people on both sides of the Brexit issue. For example, 
Andreouli et al. (2019) conceptualised Brexit through the lens of emergence, in which the 
“ordered universe of the political status quo has been disrupted and that something new is at 
play in the passage of politics” (p. 6). Their work described different styles of argumentation 
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associated with ’remainers’ and ‘leavers’ - thought and feeling – which differed crucially in 
their interpretation of political values and authority, and attached variable importance to 
affect. In a similar vein, a rhetorical analysis of focus group data with ‘remainers’ and 
‘leavers’ revealed differences in the way in which these groups oriented to the ideological 
dilemma of nationalism, as well as the contrast between reason and bias (Andreouli & 
Nicholson, 2018). Quantitative work has, for the most part, attempted to explain support for 
Brexit in psychological terms, including but not limited to: attitudes towards supranational 
governance (Peitz, Dhont, & Seyd, 2018), collective narcissism (e.g. Golec de Zavala, 
Guerra, & Simão, 2017) and concerns about immigration and political trust (Abrams & 
Travaglino, 2019). The consequences of Brexit have received comparatively less support. 
One study linked the experience of disillusionment among ‘remainers’ to increased support 
for more extreme political positions (Maher, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2018). The present study 
develops this line of work by offering insight into the way in which meta-representations are 
constructed, and how they are implicated in political action.  
The Current Study 
The current study investigated the way in which two features of a society’s meta-
representational fabric - constructions of perceived political disagreement and the opinion 
climate were implicated in people’s construals of their political participation. To examine 
this, I conducted semi-structured interviews with participants who voted to remain in the EU 
referendum in 2016, and who lived and voted in UK constituencies which represented diverse 
opinion climates in relation the Brexit issue. The decision to focus on the perspectives of 
‘remainers’ was underpinned by the conceptual tools employed in the study. Both spiral of 
silence theory and a SRA centre the perceptions and actions of minority groups in the process 
of social and political change. On a national level, it seemed plausible that those who voted to 
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remain in the EU would have recognised their beliefs as belonging to the minority, even if 
this was a slim one.  
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen British participants (8 female) participated in individual interviews in July 
2017, approximately one month after the 2017 general election. Participants were aged 
between 19 and 73 years (M = 45.84, SD = 17.93). The majority of participants (N = 15) 
were recruited through their prior completion of an online survey three months previously, at 
the end of which participants had the option to provide their email address if they were 
interested in participating in a follow-up interview (the remaining four participants were 
recruited through the author’s personal contacts, two of whom were personally known to the 
author). This survey explored similar issues to the current study, and comprised questions 
which measured UK residents who voted to remain’s collective action intentions in the 
context of Brexit, their levels of European and British identification, personal attitudes 
towards Brexit as well as the attitudes which were attributed to the British public. Participants 
were also asked to provide demographic information, including details of the constituency in 
which they lived. I recruited a convenience sample to complete this survey via advertisement 
on social media (N = 1602).  
Using the survey data, purposive sampling was adopted in order to ensure the 
diversity of participant’s opinion climates, operationalised as remain vote share in the 
participant’s constituency and the position of their local MP on Brexit (remain or leave). No 
claims are made here about the representativeness of the sample in terms of party 
identification or geographical region. However, a broad range of opinion climates is evident 
in the sample. Participants lived in constituencies with very high (72%) to very low (36%) 
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remain vote shares, and eight participants were represented by leave-supporting MPs (see 
Table 1). I aimed not to discern differences between participants depending on remain vote 
share, but to include as diverse a range of constituencies as possible. Further participant 
demographic information is provided in Table 1. All participants were assigned pseudonyms 
for the analysis.  
Procedure 
Prior to the interview, participants read information about the study and provided 
consent and demographic information via email. Interviews took place over phone, lasted 
between 25 and 63 minutes (M = 41.95, SD = 11.81), and were digitally recorded. The semi-
structured interview schedule addressed (1) participants’ engagement in and perceptions of 
anti-Brexit political action; (2) their perceptions of Brexit and the current negotiations 
between the UK government and the EU; and (3) their views about the ways in which others 
in UK society (people in their local area, national politicians) perceived and understood the 
Brexit issue.  
Analysis 
The audio files were transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). This method of analysis, described elsewhere as “a pragmatic 
approach to qualitative analysis” (Dewe & Coyle, 2014; p. 23) is useful in terms of its 
theoretical and epistemological flexibility I adopted a critical realist stance here (e.g. 
Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994; Fletcher, 2017), and followed an approach which incorporated 
both inductive and deductive aspects. The use of thematic analysis allowed the identification 
of themes which spoke to the research question, namely the relationship between perceptions 
of disagreement and opinion climate, and construals of anti-Brexit political action. However, 
as will be shown, across these themes it was also possible to discern a particular social 
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representation of public opinion more broadly, which was characterised by various attributes 
and had further consequences for political action.  
To begin the analysis, I read the transcripts numerous times in order to get an overall 
sense of the data. Following this, I applied a coding framework to the data in order to capture 
data which were relevant to the research question. There were two theoretically-derived 
priorities: (1) constructions of political participation and collective action (e.g. involvement, 
perceived efficacy, and constraints); and (2) constructions of meta-representations, in which 
all data pertaining to the opinions and perceptions attributed to a generalised majority (e.g. 
‘everybody thinks…’, ‘the public thinks…’) were coded. Following this initial coding of the 
relevant data, themes were developed and labelled by grouping codes of similar meaning. 
Finally, the themes were reviewed in order to ensure their distinctiveness, and were then 
described and interpreted in a detailed analysis.  
Findings  
The thematic structure developed in the analysis is depicted in Table S1. Four themes 
were identified: (1) a broken political system; (2) no way back from Brexit; (3) reading the 
public; and (4) individual versus collective participation. The former two themes relate to 
constructions of the UK political context and, while they provide rich descriptive detail, do 
not allow purchase on the central research question and so will not be discussed here. The 
latter two themes both relate to participants’ constructions of their engagement in anti-Brexit 
political action and the ways in which political disagreement and the opinion climate were 
implicated, and will now be discussed. 
Reading the Public 
 Throughout the discussions, participants’ talk about their experiences of political 
disagreement and their perceptions of the opinion climate elaborated a social representation 
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of public opinion which was characterised by ambivalence. Public opinion was constructed as 
inscrutable, uninformed, and broadly supportive of Brexit. Simultaneously, while it had 
frustrated participants’ pro-EU aspirations through the EU referendum result, its volatility 
necessarily left open the possibility of a future swing to a more pro-EU position. These 
elements of the social representation will now be discussed.  
Participants frequently expressed surprise at the actions of the voting public, in 
relation to both the EU referendum and the results of the 2017 general election, and they 
reflected on the meaning of these results for public opinion generally or in relation to the type 
of Brexit which the public favoured. More broadly, the Brexit vote was linked to a 
construction of the public as either misrecognised or unrecognised: participants’ expressed 
shock at a previously unseen public announcing its presence, or acknowledged that their 
beliefs about the public were in some way incorrect. This was directly linked to participants’ 
experiences of political disagreement and their readings of the opinion climate. Participants 
occupied mostly homophilic social networks: almost all participants stated that, at the time of 
the vote, they interacted with people with whom they agreed politically. Consequently, the 
EU referendum brought about a process whereby the ‘true’ nature of the public was revealed, 
or, alternatively, in which previously unacknowledged segments of the public came into 
focus: 
I:           Um what would you say that Brexit means to you personally?  
Christopher: Um eh (laughs) (pause) again it's quite a difficult, a kind of emotional, and it's 
hard, said by other people and by people in the US that I just don't feel that, I 
don't really feel (laughs) British anymore. It feels um (pause) it kind of feels 
like my country's been hijacked, that's how it feels to me. I know that's a 
ridiculous thing to say but um I just kind of feel that all the kind of values that I 
thought we shared, I thought I shared with my kind of fellow citizens, I know 
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we disagreed on lots of issues but I thought we had certain values in common, 
the majority of people had certain values in common and I think that that's just 
been ripped asunder. It's just (pause) the fact that people, and this again was 
where Trump in America, the people are willing to harm themselves 
economically eh in order to keep a minority group down and out, literally out 
of the country, is uh, is I find really shocking.              
 (44, Yorkshire & the Humber) 
*** 
Kate:  …That's something in Scotland that I noticed a lot with that, we didn't, we 
didn't have any really signs 'vote leave', 'vote remain', there was not sort of the, 
I didn't feel like we saw the same sort of visual imagery you have when there's 
an election or definitely compared to the independence referendum and it was 
only when my parents went to Cornwall that summer, and they went 'there's 
loads of leave posters, there's loads of leave posters everywhere!’ And this 
must have been a week or so before the referendum, I suddenly went ‘oh my 
god it's like different other places’! People were, we just thought people were 
kinda just they're going well, this, there's not actually that much of a debate, it's 
already been decided, we know the answer.  
(24, Scotland) 
In both of these excerpts, that the Brexit vote has brought about a process of recognition or 
misrecognition of the public is clear. For Christopher, the public has, through the referendum, 
revealed its ‘true’ nature; the basis for national identity and solidarity has been ‘ripped 
asunder’ by an act of national self-injury fuelled by anti-immigrant sentiment. His perception 
of commonality with ‘the majority of people’ has been revealed as an illusion; his country 
has been ‘hijacked’ by a public which had been previously unnoticed, a phenomenon which 
he constructs as analogous to the election of President Trump in the United States. On the 
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other hand, Kate’s account evidences a process of recognition of the British public (the 
‘people’), or the parts of it which had been unacknowledged prior to the vote. A contrast is 
developed between the visibility and polarisation of the 2014 independence referendum 
campaign in Scotland, and the absence of debate (“we know the answer”) and dearth of 
“visual imagery” of the EU referendum campaign. Related again to perceptions of the 
opinion climate, the recognition of this fundamentally different public is constructed here as 
stemming from second-hand knowledge and experience, specifically from a travel report 
from an area of England which eventually voted to leave. Given the homophilic networks 
which participants described and occupied, journalism was another means by which this 
process of recognition came about. The social representation of public opinion as inscrutable 
was thus directly related to the absence of political disagreement, or to the perception of a 
broader opinion climate which was consonant with one’s own perspective.  
Another element of the social representation of public opinion which was apparent in 
the discussions related to knowledge. The public was frequently characterised as ill-informed 
and unable to deal with complex issues, such as Brexit. This lack of political knowledge or 
interest among the public was constructed as a contributing factor in the EU referendum 
result. This social representation of public opinion as lacking in political sophistication or 
knowledge was also evident in participants’ talk about the democratic process:  
 
Paul:  The Lib Dems, they’re a remain party. The problem is their campaign, well as the 
election in any rate, they were campaigning for a second referendum and I, there isn’t 
an appetite for a second referendum. There should never be a referendum ever again 
on anything. If this is, if what happens ends up being put to bed, um it needs 
parliament to actually knock it on the head. No referendums ever again.  




Philip:  So the unpredictability of why people vote for what they do, I suppose in a sense that 
helps to create an atmosphere or a view where you think well maybe this democracy 
is a bit random and rather than people thinking carefully about what they want and 
then voting for it, they actually apply their vote to what to me would be a very 
cavalier fashion. I mean they’re entitled to, that is what democracy is but I suppose 
I’ve become slightly more conscious and hence slightly more worried about that. 
(65, South East England) 
Asked about the approaches of the different political parties to Brexit, and orienting here to 
the position of the pro-remain Liberal Democrat party to bring about a second Brexit 
referendum, Paul asserts that there should be “no referendums ever again”, while Philip 
constructs the “unpredictability” of public opinion and its ill-considered nature (and the 
consequences of this for voting behaviour) as troubling his conceptualisation of democracy. 
Both accounts, implicitly and explicitly, work to construct the public as something to be 
managed and contained, and serve to legitimate means of political representation which 
emphasise representative (rather than direct) forms of decision-making, that is through 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
The final relevant element of social representations of public opinion revealed in these 
discussions concerned its volatility. It was construed as changeable and fluid, though not 
necessarily as moving towards a more pro-EU position: “I think a lot of people have changed 
their mind from remain to leave” (Charlotte, 19, Wales). It was a disruptive force with a 
neutral valence in the data. It could have a negative (from their perspective) influence; the 
Brexit vote was often explained as a protest vote against the political establishment, to “give 
Cameron (the UK Prime Minister at the time of the EU referendum) a bloody nose” (Emily, 
52, South West England). But its disruptive potential also offered hope: 
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Philip:  Yeah I mean the hubris that she (Prime Minister Theresa May) would get a huge 
majority, we'd all fall in line, we'd all be Brexiteers (Brexit supporters) and what the 
electorate delivered was uh a loss of majority, a loss of power, a hung parliament um 
and now it means parliament itself, has got more power than it was going to get out of 
the executive. It's astonishing that the slogan was 'take back control' and that seemed 
to me, take back control to the executive or the Brexiteers, not parliament, 
parliamentary sovereignty, which is our constitution. But now I think there is a 
chance, with alliances being made, that we will get a better outcome than we did 
before, than we would have had before, or would have had were there a May majority 
government.  
(65, South East England) 
   
Here, public opinion’s volatility is constructed as a positive force – in the context of the UK 
general election of 2017, it is set up as a brake on the ambitions of political elites (“the hubris 
that she would get a huge majority”), which in this instance served to redirect power away 
from a select elite group and restore “our constitution”, the natural order of things – 
“parliamentary sovereignty”. Elsewhere, public opinion, because of its volatility, was 
constructed as a potential source of optimism in the context of Brexit: “I think when it starts 
hitting people’s pockets in a noticeable way, there might be another opportunity” (Nick, 29, 
East of England). Thus, the social representation of public opinion was characterised by 
ambivalence and contradictions, and accompanied by similar ambiguity in terms of 
participants’ construals of the possibility of overturning Brexit. 
Querying the Collective 
Participants’ situated their political participation and engagement within ‘a broken 
political system’ in the UK. Politicians were characterised as untrustworthy, unresponsive, 
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and broadly committed to Brexit. Consequently, as individuals supportive of remaining in the 
EU, there was a sense of political homelessness as they reported lack of identification with 
political parties. Furthermore, a discourse of ‘no way back from Brexit’ was worked up in the 
discussions; public opinion was construed as broadly supportive of Brexit and the fractious 
political atmosphere closed off possibilities for debate.  
Within this context, participants’ talk about their engagement in anti-Brexit political 
action and its efficacy suggested a tension between ‘individual versus collective 
participation’. The possibility and efficacy of collective action in relation to Brexit was 
queried and so, for some participants, political action was primarily constructed as occurring 
and being of value at the individual level. Individual political actions which participants 
advocated or reported engaging in were often internet-mediated (e.g. signing online petitions, 
posting on social media), or involved communicating with relevant others to make an 
individual’s opinion heard (e.g. speaking to opinion pollsters, writing to the press). Informal 
and local campaigning, rather than formal and national, was emphasised: “I was trying to 
inform people you know on social media and talking to them about the reasons why we 
should remain and feel because they're so affected by right-wing media, they just didn't 
listen” (Sarah, 35, East of England). This favouring of individual anti-Brexit political acts 
was also related to the fractiousness of current political discourse: 
James:  I'm a member of Open Britain. I tweet, I go on Facebook. I'm not sure I want to get   
involved through political parties. It's uh, it's not great, I mean my neighbour went 
to a Labour party meeting with all good intentions to take part. It was awful, it was a 
slanging match between two old war horses in the Labour party, and he came away 
thinking 'I don't want to do this'. So it's a bit like that at local level here. 




Martha:  I mean I tried to influence anyone I talked to but I didn't spend time down at the pub 
um because I thought that would just, you know end up with me being shouted at.  
(63, East of England) 
In both of these excerpts, perceptions of political disagreement and the opinion climate are 
clearly implicated in participants’ accounts of their political participation. Awareness of a 
polarised opinion climate is related in both to a conscious decision to moderate one’s political 
engagement.  
Furthermore, participants talk about the effects and outcomes of anti-Brexit political 
action reflected this tension between ‘individual versus collective participation’. While some 
participants reported being involved in cross-party pro-EU organisations following the 
referendum, their effectiveness was questioned: “I joined a plethora of, there's More United, 
organisations like that that sprung up in the immediate aftermath uh but they don't seem to 
have gone anywhere” (Christopher, 44, Yorkshire & the Humber). The government’s 
response to previous pro-EU demonstrations appeared to have a negative effect on 
participants’ judgements of the efficacy of anti-Brexit political action: 
David:  I don't see any clear-cut way of um making an individual voice heard and even and 
it's been quite disheartening to see lots of large campaigns, large protests and very 
vocal um groups um, especially given the size of the remain vote, and the fact that it's 
swatted down almost instantly. It looks like the current parliament will be holding 
fast on its position of leaving the EU, for fear of offending the 52 per cent that voted 
leave. 
(30, Greater London) 
 
Evident here and throughout the discussions was a querying of the efficacy of anti-Brexit 
collective action. Interesting here, however, is the individualised construction of efficacy 
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which is mobilised by David (“I don’t see any clear-cut way of um making an individual 
voice heard”). Relatedly, elsewhere in the discussions, the efficacy of anti-Brexit political 
action was rehabilitated with recourse to an emphasis on the benefits to the individual of 
these actions, by helping to clarify one’s thoughts or simply to make one’s view known: “I 
really did it for the self-satisfaction of recording my view and making my MP you know 
aware of it” (Philip, 65, South East England). Thus, concerns about the efficacy of anti-Brexit 
political action at the collective level were at some points assuaged via a prioritisation of 
individual benefits.  
Discussion  
Meta-representations were related to participants’ construals of engagement in anti-
Brexit political action. A social representation of public opinion characterised by 
ambivalence was evident; by participating and contributing to a discourse which emphasised 
the inevitability of Brexit, it closed down the possibility of resistance to Brexit, but as a 
volatile, inscrutable, and disruptive force, it left open the possibility of its future movement 
towards a more pro-EU position. Alongside this representation of public opinion, 
constructions of a polarised and dysfunctional political system worked to sustain a mode of 
political engagement which prioritised and viewed as efficacious individual rather than 
collective anti-Brexit action.  
Perceptions of political disagreement and of the opinion climate, in addition to 
constructions of the broader political and discursive context, worked in the data to legitimate 
forms of anti-Brexit political participation which prioritised individual rather than collective 
forms of participation. Previous (quantitative) research exploring the impact of the social 
normative context on political behaviour and expression has tended to focus on willingness to 
engage in one particular political act, for example to speak with a journalist about a political 
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issue (e.g. Louis et al., 2010) However, this analysis suggests that people may prefer different 
modes of political participation depending on the opinion climate which they occupy and the 
way in which they construe it. Thus, by focusing on specific and individual political actions, 
previous empirical work may have not picked up on this complexity. Future empirical 
studies, including those which draw upon spiral of silence theory, should therefore investigate 
the impact of perceptions of political disagreement and opinion climate on political 
behaviours and expression with reference to a wider range of political actions. 
Participants’ talk about their engagement in political processes reflected a sense of 
disillusionment in relation to the Brexit issue. None of the political parties were constructed 
by participants as fully representing their views in relation to this issue. Given that previous 
empirical work has specified collective or social identity as a critical determinant of 
collective action (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Simon et al., 1998), it remains 
unclear to what extent effective anti-Brexit collective action could effectively be mobilised 
without the presence of a unifying collective identity. Additionally, the potential of these 
individual political acts to somehow forge a sense of collective identity, which might then 
translate into collective action, should be investigated empirically using longitudinal 
methods. 
As in previous work (Maher et al., 2018), the experience of disillusionment was 
linked here to a moderation of political participation, specifically a prioritisation of individual 
expressions of political opinion and atomised anti-Brexit actions, however unlike the 
previous work it did not appear to lead to support for more extreme political views or actions. 
Leading from this, it is an open question in the data as to whether this movement towards 
individual rather than collective anti-Brexit action, precipitated by perceptions of public 
opinion and the political context, affords the public with a greater voice in the Brexit debate. 
Two interpretations are possible here. Firstly, that disenchantment with party politics is 
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experienced as demobilising in the absence of formal political structures and there is 
consequently a reduced capacity for influence. Conversely, it could be interpreted that lack of 
alignment with party structures could, via the muted influence of elite cues, lead to a higher 
capacity for social influence. These explanations are worth further theoretical and empirical 
investigation. 
Participants frequently judged the public to be ill-informed politically or not in 
possession of the resources necessary for dealing with complex issues. Simultaneously, 
public opinion was constructed as volatile and as a disruptive force, which was necessarily 
neutral in valence. It had frustrated participants’ wishes on the 23rd June 2016, but equally it 
had declined to extend its mandate to the Conservative party to pursue a Brexit of its sole 
determination in the 2017 general election. Thus, public opinion was constructed as 
something to be contained and managed, as well as a possible brake on Brexit in the future.  
The social representation of public opinion as something to be contained and managed  
implicitly endorsed moves away from more direct forms of democracy, to calls to strengthen 
the functioning of representative, parliamentary democracy, which was constructed as the 
‘natural order’ of the UK political system. The findings here suggest that emergent forms 
such as Brexit (Andreouli et al., 2019) may reposition the legitimacy of political authority via 
a refiguring of the status afforded to the public and its opinion. The lack of status granted to 
public opinion here may be related to the different styles of argumentation associated with 
’remainers’ and ‘leavers’ - thought and feeling (Andreouli et al., 2019), or to their difference 
stances vis a vis the nationalism dilemma and the reason/bias distinction (Andreouli & 
Nicholson, 2018). Distrust of the public makes sense when the style of that public’s 
engagement with political issues is unintelligible. 
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This dynamic interplay between constructions of public opinion, construals of 
political authority, and support for specific forms of democratic governance can be illustrated 
with two examples. Firstly, the ‘People’s Vote’ campaign for a second, confirmatory 
referendum, has been salient to varying extents since the referendum result was announced. 
Secondly, Prime Minister Johnson’s August 2019 proposal to suspend parliament for a period 
of five weeks prior to the date of the UK’s mooted date of departure. Both of these examples 
have been construed as a means of enacting public opinion and a subversion of it. Thus, 
depending on which social representation of public opinion is mobilised, authority or 
ignominy is conferred on political elites, and decisions are either democratic outrages, or 
eminently sensible.  
The interplay between these constructs warrants further theoretical and empirical 
examination to increase understanding of the direction of future democratic support, as well 
as for other forms of governance, ranging from more participatory and inclusive forms of 
democracy (e.g. citizen assemblies) to support for policies which might indicate a shift 
towards autocracy (e.g. suppression of the media, restrictions on civil liberties etc.). Recent 
events in the UK, United States, Brazil, and elsewhere, underscore the necessity of not taking 
democratic support for granted, and a political psychology which recognises this is required. 
The findings of this study suggest the SRA as a suitable candidate for this task.  
The social representation of public opinion as volatile afforded a sense of ‘narrative 
plausibility’ (Mahendran et al., 2015) to the story of the UK’s continued engagement with the 
EU. Previous work exploring the impact of public opinion on political behaviour and 
expression has tended to emphasise its negative effects, its potential to silence or close down 
possibilities for action (e.g. Bassili, 2003; Noelle-Neumann, 1974). However, in line with 
previous work (Louis et al., 2010; O’Dwyer et al., 2016), these findings are suggestive of the 
empowering potential of perceptions of political disagreement and the prevailing opinion 
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climate. A SRA, by emphasising the constructed, context-dependent, and changeable nature 
of these aspects of the meta-representational fabric highlights this agentic potential. 
That the social representation of public opinion is characterised by tensions and 
contradictions, is, I would argue, grounded in the ambivalence which characterises lay 
thinking about the nature of the masses themselves. Salient here is a narrative which 
construes the collective as irrational and emotional, as a threat to the autonomy, freedom, and 
rationality of the individual (Greenwood, 2004). These values are foundational for political 
liberalism, a belief system which, arguably, has buttressed the social psychology’s historic 
individualistic focus (Farr, 1996; Klein, 2009). This interpretation sheds light on the potential 
contribution of a SRA to the understanding of dynamic democratic processes via: (1) making 
salient the ideological baggage which meta-representations carry; and (2) calling our 
attention to their historical and contextual contingency.   
There are a number of limitations to the current study. Firstly, participants identified 
with left-wing or centre-left parties. None identified with the Conservative party, even though 
Conservatives voters clearly did vote to remain in the EU, albeit perhaps for different reasons 
to the justifications offered by the participants here. It may have been the case that such 
potential participants were more reluctant to participate in this research. Given that the focus 
of this study was the way in which perceived political disagreement and opinion climate were 
constructed and implicated in people’s construals of their engagement in anti-Brexit political 
action, this may not be too problematic. However future research on this issue should do 
more to include ‘remainers’ who do not identify with centre-left/left-wing political parties.  
Secondly, there may be apprehension about the validity of any claims which can be 
drawn from these data, or about the robustness of the analysis. Any claims to represent in an 
objective way the perspectives of these participants would be counter to the objectives of 
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qualitative research, which foregrounds participants’ subjective understandings and 
meanings, and recognises the integral role of the researcher in the research process. However, 
steps were taken to ensure that the research fulfilled criteria essential for rigorous and 
reflexive qualitative research (e.g. Yardley, 2000), for example through writing memos and 
recording impressions of the interviews.  
In summary, and consonant with previous work in social psychology and political 
science, this study shows that perceptions of political disagreement and the opinion climate 
are central to people’s understandings of their engagement in political processes. However, it 
also suggests that the opinion climate might alter the preferred mode of political participation. 
Furthermore, the representation of public opinion evident here highlights the necessity of 
investigating the valence which is attached to the opinion climate, and of acknowledging that 
this may be ambivalent and contradictory, with concomitant consequences for political 
behaviour, as well as support for different types of democratic governance. Taken together, 
these findings emphasise the importance of considering the relationship between meta-
representations and political action, but make the case for conceptualising this relationship as 
shifting and dialogical. Social norms are not facts ‘out there’ which people incorporate into 
their decision-making in an unthinking way – they are constructed, interpreted, engaged with, 
and perhaps, resisted.  
 




Demographic and political characteristics of participants and constituency information 












Amya 28 Female Employed Lab Greater London 58.1 Con Leave 
Andrew 55 Male Employed None Greater London 77.6 Lab Leave 
Charlottea 19 Female Student Lab Wales 50.4 Con Leave 
Christopher 44 Male Employed None Yorkshire & the Humber 36.3 Lab Remain 
Colin 73 Male Retired Lab East of England 72.4 Lab Remain 
Davida 30 Male Employed None Greater London 51.6 Con Leave 
Emily 52 Female Unemployed GP South West England 53.0 Con Remain 
Geraldine 49 Female Student Lab Northern Ireland 50.4 DUP Leave 
James 71 Male Retired Lab North West England 41.5 Lab Remain 
Julie 40 Female Employed None East of England 38.1 Lab Remaind 
Kate 24 Female Employed GP Scotland 61.9 SNP Remain 
Martha 63 Female Unemployed Lab East of England 45.1 Con Leave 
Nick 29 Male Employed Lab East of England 62.6 Con Leave 
Paul 40 Male Employed None East of England 36.8 Con Remain 
Petera 65 Male Retired Lab South West England 53.0 Con Remain 
Philip 65 Male Retired None South East England 46.0 Con Remain 
Sam 22 Male Employed None Greater London 75.4 Lab Remain 
Sandra 67 Female Employed LD Scotland 75.0 SNP Remain 
Sarah 35 Female Employed Lab South East England 37.6 Con Leave 
a These participants were recruited through personal contacts of the researcher.  
b Lab = Labour Party, Con = Conservatives, DUP = Democratic Unionist Party, SNP = Scottish National Party, GP = Green Party, Lib Dem = 
Liberal Democrats. 
c Aside from this constituency, all participants were represented by an MP of the same party at the time of the referendum and after the 2016 
general election. This constituency switched from Conservative to Labour in 2016.  
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Level 1-3 themes developed in the thematic analysis 
Codes (Level 1) Subthemes (Level 2) Themes (Level 3) 
 Identification with political parties 
 A political vacuum 
 Lack of political opposition 
 Inadequate political leaders 
a) No one to vote for 
 
 
1.   A Broken Political System 
 
“I would have characterised myself 
liberal Labour-ish, um but no, now, I 
don’t know where I am either”.  
(Julie, 40, East of England) 
 Lack of accountability of politicians 
 Lack of trust in politicians 
 Politicians aren’t listening 
 Safe seats and powerlessness 
b)    Politicians cannot 
be trusted to be 
responsive 
 Fractious political discourse 
 Can’t reason with Leavers 
 Will of the people must be respected 
 Impossibility of a second referendum 
a)    Communication  2.   No Way Back From Brexit 
 
“I’m not sure there’s much demand 
from the country for a second 
referendum”.  
(Christopher, 44, Yorkshire & the 
Humber) 
 No public demand for a second referendum 
 People have accepted the referendum result 
 Public opinion is behind Brexit  
b)    Pro-Brexit public 
opinion 
 Direct democracy doesn’t work 
 Distrust of the public 
 The public can disrupt the plans of politicians 
a) Disruptive force 
 
3.   Reading the Public 
 
“So the unpredictability of why people 
vote for what they do…you think well 
maybe this democracy is a bit 
random…”  
(Philip, 65, South East England) 
 
 
“…people don't read the news, they 
read headlines”. 
(Martha, 63, East of England) 
 The public was misidentified 
 Acknowledging a different public 
 The meaning of votes for public opinion 
b) Inscrutable 
 Social media causes people to be less politically 
informed 
 The public is ill-equipped to deal with complex 
issues 
 Not that engaged in politics 
 The public is overwhelmed by Brexit 
 The public memory 
c) Knowledge 
 Brexit has politicised the public 
 Change in public opinion 
 Public may realise Brexit is a mistake 
 Public opinion is fractured 
 The mood of the public 
 The public is bored of Brexit 
d) Volatility 
 Communicating with opinion pollsters 
 Contacting MP about Brexit 
 Informal campaigning for remain 
 Attending pro-EU demonstrations 
 Signing online petitions 
 Using social media to express political views 
 Voting tactically 
 Writing letters to the press for the remain 
campaign 
a) Forms of political 
participation 
4.   Individual versus Collective     
Participation 
 
“I tweet, I go on Facebook. I'm not sure 
I want to get involved through political 
parties. … It was a slanging match 
between two old war horses in the 
Labour party, and he came away 
thinking 'I don't want to do this'.” 
(James, 71, North West England) 
 
 Individual benefits of participation 
 Easier to influence things locally 
 Lack of efficacy of political protest 
 No point being active in remain areas 
b) Outcomes  
